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Abstract  
For several decades, political economists have taken interest in how institutional configurations 
influence economic performance in advanced capitalist democracies. In this paper, we argue that 
complementarities between the welfare state and the production system can help explain differences 
in long-run economic performance. Integrating core theoretical aspects from the Varieties of Capi-
talism (VoC) approach with welfare state research, we argue that long-run economic growth is con-
ditioned by the extent to which different welfare state configurations are complementary to produc-
tion systems. Using time-series cross-section (TSCS) data on 17 OECD-countries from 1974-2009 
we find support for the hypothesis that highly strategically coordinated and decommodified econo-
mies, as well as a highly market coordinated and commodified economies economically,  outper-
form economies with intermediate institutional setups over the long run. This supports the need for 
a new research agenda integrating production regimes and welfare state characteristics in explaining 
economic performance.  
 
Keywords: Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Welfare State Capitalism, Welfare production re-
gime, Economic Growth, Institutional Complementarity, OECD-countries, Time-series Cross-
Section. 
* We wish to thank Jørgen Goul Andersen, Jan Holm Ingemann, Michael Ash, Jacob Rubæk Holm, and Finn Olesen for valu-
able comments. 
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Introduction 
 
For several decades, political economists have been interested in how institutional configurations 
can influence increased economic performance. Since Shonfield’s (1965) seminal work on national 
political-economic systems, it has become conventional wisdom that there is more than one viable 
road to economic growth. The question, however, remains: What determines these paths and what 
are their dynamics?  
Several strands of research have contributed to our understanding of the interrelationship be-
tween institutions and economic growth. The most prominent are the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature, which emphasizes institutional complementarity and coherence in production systems as 
a determinant of economic performance at the macro level (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Whereas Ken-
worthy (2006) argues that there is no apparent association between more institutional coherent vari-
eties of coordination and economic performance at the macro level (see also Cambell & Pedersen, 
2007), Hall and Gingerich (2009) have shown that market economies with higher degrees of coher-
ence in labor market relations and corporate governance structures experience higher economic 
growth compared to less coherent market economies. Martin & Swank (2012) also find support for 
the framework, applying the argument more broadly to employers’ organization as well as macro 
corporatist arrangements. It remains debatable within this literature whether economies that are 
more institutionally coherent create better economic performance than less coherent systems. 
A second influential strand of literature links VoC and welfare state research and is most promi-
nently represented by welfare production regime (WPR) theory (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001; Iversen 
& Soskice, 2001; Iversen, 2005; Schröder, 2009). These scholars contend that particular combina-
tions of welfare state compositions and coordination institutions can create relatively more efficient 
economies. To the best of our knowledge, it is still to be tested if the interaction between coordina-
tion and social protection does influence economic growth – and under what conditions. 
In this paper, we investigate both literatures in a twofold analysis, empirically testing the two 
perspectives using time-series cross-section (TSCS) regression techniques on 17 advanced capitalist 
systems from 1974-2009. We find that the results from Hall and Gingerich’s (2009) study, empha-
sizing a quadratic relationship between coordination institutions and economic growth, only receive 
partial empirical support. However, more robust support appears for our revised WPR hypotheses. 
The results indicate that a small and commodified welfare state complements production in liberal 
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market economies (LMEs), whereas a large and decommodified welfare state complement produc-
tion in coordinated market economies (CMEs).  
 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present a coherent empirical analysis that links 
the literature of varieties of coordination with varieties of welfare state capitalism in explaining 
economic growth at the macro level in industrialized democracies. Doing so fills an important gap 
in the literature as “research linking institutional differences to specific economic outcomes has 
remained surprisingly underdeveloped” (Witt & Jackson, 2016: 780). 
The paper is structured as follows; Firstly, we outline the theoretical framework based on the 
VoC-framework and Welfare Production Regime (WPR) theory. Secondly, the framework is tested 
empirically, using time-series cross-section (TSCS) regression analysis on 17 OECD-countries, and 
finally, we conclude with remarks on the findings and suggestions for future research agendas. 
 
 
Varieties of Capitalism 
 
The analysis below builds on Varieties of Capitalism theory1 (Hall & Soskice, 2001) and Welfare 
Production Regime theory (Iversen, 2005; Schröder, 2009).  
From the VoC approach, we take the central insight that political economies are characterized by 
a particular institutional infrastructure that conditions firms’ endeavors (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 15). 
In their original formulation Hall & Soskice (2001) distinguish between two general forms of mar-
ket capitalism – liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). 
LMEs are most often found in the Anglophone countries (such as the United States, Australia, and 
the United Kingdom) where the institutional infrastructure is characterized by relative deregulated 
labor markets, a workforce with an abundance of general skills (often acquired through school-
based training systems), short-term investments and arms-lengths contracting. CMEs are typically 
clustered in central and northern Europe (such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden), where the insti-
tutional infrastructure is generally characterized by a workforce with an abundance of specific skills 
(either specific at the firm or industry level), long-term investments and relational contracting. 
                                                        
1 The VoC framework has been criticized for being too rigid and having trouble accounting for institutional change. 
Some of these critiques do have merit. However, since we are interested in institutional effects (outcomes) and not insti-
tutional change, we will not engage further in this debate. For an overview of critiques see Crouch (2005) and Becker 
(2007), and for some rebuttals see Hall & Soskice (2003) and Hall & Thelen (2008).  
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Furthermore, a key insight derived from the VoC-framework is that institutional complementari-
ties among certain institutions can create comparative institutional advantages (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: 36-40). The core argument, according to Hall & Soskice (2001), is that certain institutional 
infrastructures can increase firms’ innovative capacities, which is crucial for their competitiveness 
and hence survival in the long run. The primary distinction in the literature is between radical inno-
vations – such as the development of new products or major shifts in production methods – and 
incremental innovations, characterized by continuous and minor improvements of existing products 
and production methods. Firms in LMEs are generally superior in the development of radical inno-
vations since the institutional infrastructure in LMEs – such as flexible labor markets, short-term, 
mobile investment capital and a labor force with general skills – is more compatible with rapid 
changes in volatile sectors. Firms in CMEs are, on the contrary, thought to be superior in the devel-
opment of incremental innovations2 since the institutional infrastructure – such as long-term in-
vestments and a highly specialized workforce – is highly compatible with incremental innovation 
strategies (e.g. civil engineering and engines). Firms in LMEs rely, in other words, on market coor-
dination, where firms in CMEs to a larger extent rely more heavily on strategic coordination. Firms 
in LMEs vis-á-vis CMEs will, therefore, in general, specialize in distinct production strategies given 
the different institutional infrastructure and can hence create a competitive edge in certain product 
markets. According to Hall and Gingerich (2009), this translates into relatively higher economic 
growth rates at the aggregate level. 
 
Welfare Production Regimes 
 
Welfare Production Regime (WPR) theory builds on the core insights from VoC, but emphasizes 
the interaction between the welfare state and the production system more explicitly (Estevéz-Abe et 
al., 2001; Iversen, 2005.; Schröder, 2009). As such WPR tries to link welfare state research with the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature. Here we are interested in linking the social protection aspect of 
the welfare state (decommodification) with the coordination of the economy in explaining econom-
ic growth. 
Mainstream welfare state research asserts that welfare policies tend to cluster into distinct wel-
fare regimes3 that produce different social outcomes – or what Esping-Andersen (1990) calls de-
                                                        
2 Or diversified quality production in accordance with Streeck (1991). 
3 As regards welfare regimes, the classical distinction is between liberal welfare states that produces low levels of 
decommodification, conservative welfare regimes that produces medium levels of decommodification and social 
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commodification. Esping-Andersen defines decommodification as that which “occurs when a ser-
vice is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance 
on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21-22).  
There are several aspects of the welfare state that can be expected to condition the effects of co-
ordination on economic growth arising in the literature. One key argument is that a decommodified 
welfare state can work as a beneficial constraint that gives firms incentives to specialize in quality 
production and workers to engage in high-productivity employment, given the higher production 
cost induced by the welfare state (Schröder, 2013: 77-78; Streeck, 1997). The modus operandi in 
LMEs is different. Assuming that workers’ livelihood to a large degree depends on the (la-
bor)market in commodified welfare states, workers will have to be highly flexible and mobile. 
Since production in the private sector – and in particular price sensitive sectors – in LMEs depends 
on a flexible workforce, a commodified welfare state can be said to complement the production 
(Schröder, 2013). For the sake of simplicity, we will call this a flexibility argument. 
Another argument that is highly compatible with the first, is what we term the skill-asset/social-
security argument:4  Firms in CMEs are expected to demand highly qualified and specific skills in 
order to innovate incrementally5. At the same time workers investing in asset-specific skills demand 
social security since investments in specific skills are related with more risks (Cusack et al. 2006; 
Iversen, 2005: chapter 3; Iversen & Soskice, 2001). Given that the welfare state in a CME can pro-
vide the necessary security, the workers will be more willing to invest in asset-specific skills, which 
will result in an abundance of specific skills and hence comparative advantages in product markets 
requiring asset specific skills (Estevez Abe et al., 2001). Contrary to CMEs, firms in LMEs demand 
general skills in order to innovate radically. Since investment in general and transferable skills is 
related with less risk, workers in LMEs will tend to demand less social security relative to workers 
in CMEs (Iversen & Soskice, 2001). Given that the welfare state in a LME does not give the worker 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
democratic welfare states that produces high levels of decommodification (se Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-29). 
However, rather than operationalizing regimes strictly, we operationalize degrees of Decommodification. This is 
a comon strategy employed in most empirical studies  
 
4 The argument presented here can be viewed as implicitly assuming size-homogenous firms, which does not conform 
to empirical facts. An often used and very helpful distinction is between small, medium and large firms or corporations. 
An aspect of relevance related to firm size, as well as the described complementarity, is within firm routines, which has 
gained considerable interest in the evolutionary economics literature (Becker, 2004). Depending on the dominating firm 
structure in a country (or sector/industry), different welfare state regimes (and policies) can have varying degrees of 
complementarity to firms’ endeavors (see for example Mares, 2001a). We do not delve further theoretically or empiri-
cally into this perspective here. 
5 The account of the welfare state in this paper highly underscores the welfare state as being functional to the production 
system. However, the welfare state is obviously also about non-functional aspects such as redistribution, conflict, etc. 
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an incentive to invest in asset-specific skills (meaning providing the worker with a high degree of 
social security), the workers will tend to invest in general and transferable skills and hence give 
firms in LMEs relative advantages in product markets requiring general skills (Estevez Abe et al., 
2001)6. 
The welfare state is as such viewed as capable of providing incentivizes for the economy to spe-
cialize in different production strategies as well as providing the workers with the necessary securi-
ty to supply the needed skills for production. As Iversen (2005: 74) puts it: “firms do not develop 
competitive advantages in spite of systems of social protection but because of it”. 
Welfare states and production regimes, according to this perspective, are integrated and interact-
ing elements of the political economy. Support for this is furthermore substantiated by the positive 
correlation between coordination and decommodification (see figure 2). As the figure shows, there 
is a strong correlation between coordination and decommodification (R2=0.66). The figure moreo-
ver shows that countries seem to cluster around the north-east corner and the south-west corner of 
the figure. With some variation, we find in the north-eastern corner countries with relatively high 
degrees of (strategic) coordination and decommodification. In the south-west corner of the figure, 
we find countries with a relatively low degree of coordination (i.e. market coordination) and low 
levels of decommodification. That varieties of coordination is closely connected with different wel-
fare state compositions, therefore, seems likely. 
Although the list of possible complementarities between welfare states and varies of coordina-
tion is extensive (for a thorough treatment see Schröder, 2009, 2013), it is difficult to determine 
exactly what complementarities are the most important. As we work at an aggregate level several 
alternate complementarities between production systems and welfare state regimes might also affect 
economic performance. The beneficial constraints and skill asset/social security arguments serve 
here as potential candidates and we will view them as the main arguments in the empirical analysis. 
 
 
Figure 1. Correlation between coordination and decommodification, average values for the period 
1974-2009. 
                                                        
6 Like Esteves-Abe et al. (2001: 146 fn. 2) we do not argue that social security is the only institution required for a suc-
cessful investment strategy. The composition of industrial relations as well as corporate governance matters a great deal 
too. The skill asset/social security argument is merely an example, although an important example, of how the welfare 
state can complement the production system. 
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Note: Coordination data is an extrapolated version of Hicks & Kenworthy’s (1998) neo-corporatism index. Decommod-
ification data is a slightly different version of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index obtained from 
Scruggs et al. (2014).  
 
Hypotheses 
 
From each of the two perspectives, we have introduced we draw hypotheses that we will test empir-
ically. Drawing solely on the VoC perspective, and in accordance with the initial analysis by Hall & 
Gingerich (2009), we expect that economies with more coherent coordination institutions will see 
relatively higher economic growth.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Institutionally coherent varieties of coordination will excel 
in economic growth relative to less coherent market systems. 
 
Building on the WPR framework we further expect LMEs with a commodified welfare state as 
well as CMEs with a decommodified welfare state to attain relatively higher rates of economic 
growth. As such we expect more institutionally coherent market systems to achieve relatively high-
er economic growth rates.  
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Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of coordination will have a positive effect on 
economic growth in decommodified economies. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Lower levels of coordination will have a positive effect on 
economic growth in commodified economies. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 serves to reassess the existing empirical analysis within the VoC 
framework, whereas the latter hypotheses extend it by incorporating the insights from 
the WPR framework.  
 
Methodology: Defining Economic performance, Institutional Variables, and Estimation 
 
To test the three hypotheses, we apply time-series cross-section (TSCS) regression techniques on 
observations from 17 OECD countries7 over the period 1974-2009. The selection of countries is 
based on the theoretical emphasis on developed democratic economies. It has, however, been con-
strained by the availability of data.8 The choice of timeframe has been influenced partly by notions 
from Hicks & Kenworthy (1998) and Kenworthy (2006), suggesting that when estimating growth 
models this should be done within business cycles to prevent non-comparability across different 
stages of the business cycles. Estimating the models from 1974-2009 provides four fully completed 
business cycles – 1974-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-2000 and 2001-2009. In estimating the models, it 
would have been preferable to go even further back in time in order to test whether our argument 
can account for the high growth period in our sample of countries before the 1970s. Unfortunately, 
the availability of data before the 1970s is highly limited. 
In the analysis, we center our attention on three variables: Economic growth, coordination, and 
welfare states. For all regressions, the dependent variable is economic growth measured by the rate 
of growth of real gross domestic product per capita – a widely used measure of economic perfor-
mance in the literature (Hall & Gingerich, 2009). Coordination and welfare states are the explana-
tory variables of particular interest. The indicator for the degree of coordination is a composite in-
                                                        
7 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
8 Other contenders to be included in the analysis are countries such as Spain and Portugal, but it has, due to missing data 
problems, been necessary to exclude these countries from the analysis. 
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dex based on 11 indicators collected from Hicks and Kenworthy’s (1998) data on neo-corporatism9 
(Huber et al., 2004). The index captures some of the central differences between the two production 
systems, CMEs and LMEs (for a further description of the coordination index, see the appendix). 
Our welfare state indicator measures the degree of decommodification, using a slightly modified 
version of Esping-Andersen’s decommodification index. This includes scores for unemployment, 
sickness, and pensions (Scruggs, et al., 2014).10 To test the first hypothesis, we include only coor-
dination in the regressions whereas we include an interaction term between the two variables when 
testing the latter two hypotheses. We assume that for the combinations of institutions to have inter-
acting effects, the interaction term must be significant. The effects on growth are determined by 
finding marginal effects, holding one set of institutions fixed at certain levels (Kam & Franzese, 
2009).11 Such a test can, according to Hall & Gingerich, 2009: 466), be considered a “hard test for 
institutional analysis (…) [b]ecause aggregate rates of growth depend on the efficiency of the entire 
economy, specific sets of institutions will have to make substantial contributions to efficiency to 
show up in aggregate rates of growth”. 
Aware of the potential conflicting variables that can be driving the empirical results, we include 
a number of economic and political control variables in the regression models.12 These include hu-
man capital, for which we use a composite index based on average years of schooling (Barro & 
Lee, 2012) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Human capital is generally expected to 
be positively correlated with growth, often entering as a factor-input in economic growth models 
(Mankiw et al., 1992; Romer, 1990). Inflation is measured as percentage change in CPI per year 
(OECD, 2016). Higher levels of inflation rates are usually expected to be negatively correlated with 
economic growth as high rates of inflation may, among other things, lower exports and raise im-
ports due to terms of trade, as well as induce uncertainty around real economic returns and hence 
reduce economic activity (Fischer, 1993; Levine & Renelt, 1992)13. International Demand is a 
measure of economic demand from other countries, computed as the mean growth rate of all other 
countries in each year, weighted by the country’s trade openness (the ratio of the sum of imports 
                                                        
9 Since the data on coordination ends in 1994, we have extrapolated the data for the missing years. The tendency to 
time-invariance of the index suggest that this should introduce no major source of bias in the estimates.  
10 Using de-commodification as a proxy for the welfare state has several advantages. First, using de-commodification as 
a proxy for social security says, contrary to levels of welfare state spending, a great deal about social citizenship and 
solidarity, which is integral to the understanding of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19-20). Secondly, using 
the decommodification index allows one to look at the political economy in a broader manner, since it accounts for 
several welfare dimensions. 
11 As we standardize the indexes a one unit changes corresponds to a one standard deviation change in either variable. 
12 The economic controls are all from the Penn World Tables, unless otherwise noted. 
13 However, Bruno (1995) and Levine & Renelt (1992) show that the relationship between economic growth and infla-
tion is unstable and possibly contextually dependent.  
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and exports to GDP). Theory of aggregate demand suggests that higher international demand raises 
production, and as such the effect of international demand is assumed to be positively correlated 
with growth. Similar expectations can be attached to Government spending, measured as the share 
of government consumption as a percentage of GDP14. Investment is measured as a percentage 
share of GDP and is assumed to have a positive effect on economic growth due to demand effects. 
Higher investment levels may also amount to more capital, used to produce higher levels of GDP 
per capita (Solow, 1956; Barro, 1991). The dependency ratio is measured as the percentage of the 
population under 15 and over 64 as a share of the working-age population. A higher dependency 
ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with growth as a higher dependency ratio is an indica-
tion of relatively less available labor, and hence lower production levels in the neoclassical frame-
work – especially in the long run. Finally, we include, as a last economic control variable, the loga-
rithm of real GDP per capita in 1974. This is done in order to control for catch-up effects that any 
country may exhibit (Barro, 1991). 
In recent years, it has become more common to include political variables in growth regressions 
in order to factor in more electoral-institutional related aspects of the political economy (Persson & 
Tabellini, 2003). Inspired by Hall & Gingerich (2009), we therefore include the following three 
political variables: Plurality Voting, District Magnitude, and Left Cabinet. Plurality Voting is an 
indicator measuring how legislators are elected. The value 1 indicates that legislators are elected by 
plurality voting (winner-takes-all) – values of 0 if not. District Magnitude is an indicator that 
measures the average district magnitude in the lower house. Plurality and District Magnitude are, 
due to political rents, expected to be positively correlated with economic growth (Hall & Gingerich, 
2009: 467; see also Persson & Tabellini, 2003). Left Cabinet captures partisan preferences and is 
measured as the share of seats in parliament held by leftist parties as a percentage of all seats in 
government. The literature has not come to any consensus with respect to Left Cabinet15. 
To estimate the regression models we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) to test the hypotheses (Beck & Katz, 1995). To test the first hypothesis, we 
include a regression model with a quadratic coordination variable:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
                                                        
14 This is; however, disputable as much economic research has shown that higher government spending may crowd out 
private investments (see for example Barro, 1991).  
15 The disagreements on the effects of Left Cabinet are similar to the ones on government spending.  
 
11 
 
were 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable for country i in year t. The coordination variable appears in quad-
ratic term to allow for the expected non-linear effect on economic growth. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of the con-
trol variables with associated coefficients found in the vector 𝜆𝜆. Finally, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the panel clustered 
standard errors. For the second and third hypotheses, we change the specification by introducing a 
interaction term between decommodification variable and the coordination variable:   
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
As heterogeneity between countries (e.g. culture, religion, geography and the like) may not nec-
essarily be assumed randomly distributed (not even after controlling for our institutional features) 
the models may exhibit endogeneity bias. Following Martin & Swank (2012) and Busemeyer 
(2015) we, however, refrain from using country fixed effects as these are too closely correlated with 
our institutional variables to allow for estimation. We do estimate the models with year fixed effects 
in order to control for individual year effects.  
We also estimate panel unit root tests for heterogeneous panels (Im, et al., 2003; Enders, 2010: 
243) to investigate whether potential issues of unit roots can be driving the resulting estimates16. 
The test indicates that there are no major problems with unit root non-stationarity, supporting the 
use of the model. 
In all of the estimated models presented below, all right-hand-side time-varying variables are 
lagged by one period (including a lagged dependent variable in particular control settings, to take 
into consideration some of the autoregressive behavior of GDP growth rates), with the exception of 
the institutional variables, which are all lagged by 5 periods17. The choice of 5 periods follows from 
the expectations that changes in institutions may have a time-wise, long transition path to affecting 
growth rates. 
 
  
                                                        
16 A Fisher like Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test, which is standard in the literature, has been estimated as well 
and shows similar results.  
17 We have also estimated the models with 1 year lags. The results are generally robust to these changes. 
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Findings: The Effect of Institutional Complementarities between Production Regimes and 
Welfare States on Economic Growth 
 
Table 1.Prais-Winsten estimates between coordination and economic growth. 
  
 
The results from estimation of models related to the VoC hypothesis are presented in table 1. Model 
I estimates the base model including a lagged dependent variable and economic control variables. 
Model II includes the political control variables, and model III and IV reiterates without a lagged 
dependent variable. The evidence suggests that different varieties of coordination influence eco-
nomic growth by highly significant estimate on the squared coordination variable across specifica-
tions. This seems to be the case even when we control for our three political factors as well as ex-
 I II III IV
 dGDPc dGDPc dGDPc dGDPc
Lagged Dependent variable 0.358*** 0.315*** __ __
 (0.0516) (0.0532)   
sCoordination -0.152 -0.370*** -0.228 -0.588***
 (0.0997) (0.138) (0.146) (0.190)
sCoordination2 0.269*** 0.233*** 0.376*** 0.310***
 (0.0895) (0.0890) (0.126) (0.120)
Human Capital -0.493** -0.546** -0.581* -0.744**
(0.239) (0.246) (0.334) (0.326)
Inflation -0.0727** -0.0988*** -0.130*** -0.134***
(0.0299) (0.0314) (0.0398) (0.0382)
Investments -5.919*** -6.167*** -6.265** -6.464**
-1.980 -2.077 -2.550 -2.602
Government $ -2.501 -4.064* -2.422 -5.113
-2.240 -2.286 -3.288 -3.132
LGDPc1974 -0.163 -0.119 -0.249 -0.121
(0.151) (0.159) (0.220) (0.218)
Dependency ratio 0.00136 -0.00851 0.000201 -0.0146
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0332) (0.0312)
IntDemand 0.00361*** 0.00257** 0.00428*** 0.00323**
(0.000968) (0.00112) (0.00124) (0.00138)
Plurality __ -0.741*** __ -1.145***
 (0.220)  (0.289)
MDMH __ -0.00685*** __ -0.00886***
 (0.00182)  (0.00259)
LEFTC __ 0.00197 __ 0.00434*
  (0.00193)  (0.00232)
N 612 612 612 612
adj. R 2 0.60 0.61 0.54 0.53
Standard errors in parentheses
* p  < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01
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cluding the lagged dependent variable from the analysis. Figure two graphically depicts the estimat-
ed effects of the squared coordination variable. The figure shows the expected u-shaped effect as 
found by Hall and Gingerich (2009). However, only highly institutionally coherent LMEs experi-
ence a statistically significant effect on economic growth relative to political economies with more 
intermediate levels of coordination, whereas for coherent CMEs the effects of coordination are not 
statistically significant from more intermediate levels of coordination at the very extreme values. It 
is furthermore not possible to say if coherent LMEs outperform coherent CMEs. 
One could, therefore, be inclined to conclude that it is only in highly market coordinated econo-
mies that the organization of production has a significantly different effect on economic perfor-
mance. However, we would argue that two caveats should apply. Firstly, the effects of coordination 
can be conditioned by other central factors, such as the welfare state as we assert in our second and 
third hypotheses. Coordination can, therefore, as we would expect, have different effects on eco-
nomic growth given distinct welfare configurations. Secondly, the VoC model fails to explain why 
several northern European countries have managed to perform equally well economically as their 
anglophone counterpart. The VoC model, as tested here, seems less suited at explaining real pat-
terns of economic growth. 
 
14 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of coordination on economic growth. Based on model 1 in table 1. 
 
 
Turning to the second and third hypotheses, table 2 shows the resulting regression models. The 
setup of control variables is similar to that of table 1. For all models, the interaction term between 
the degree of coordination and decommodification is significant at the 0.05 level. This renders 
strong support to our thesis that the welfare state complements the production system in creating 
economic growth. When the political variables are included, the interaction term between coordina-
tion and decommodification is still significantly correlated with economic growth (see model II & 
IV in table 2). The marginal effects in model II are also equal to those in model I (not shown). Since 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can suppress the explanatory power of other variables 
(Achen, 2000), we also estimate the base model without a lagged dependent variable. As the OLS 
models (III & IV) show, excluding the lagged dependent variable does not change the results, alt-
hough, the R2 value drops (as expected). The empirical results, in general, therefore seem to be both 
rather robust, and supportive of the two hypotheses18.  
 
 
 
  
                                                        
18 We also have tried to estimate the models over different time periods (1980-2009) and we do in general get the same 
results (not shown). 
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Table 2. Interaction between coordination, decommodification and economic growth, 1974-2009  
    
 
 
To interpret the coefficients, we estimate and show the marginal effects of coordination given 
various levels of decommodification in figure 3 (Brambor, 2006).19 The figure indicates that coor-
dination has a positive effect on economic growth in moderate to highly decommodified economies. 
The confidence interval, moreover, shows that the effects are different from 0. The figure also 
shows that an increase in coordination is negatively correlated with growth in moderately and high-
ly commodified economies. The marginal effects from the interaction term therefore indicate that 
the combination of high levels of coordination and decommodification, as well as low levels of 
                                                        
19 The estimation is based on model I in table 1. Depending on the model the effects are either greater or smaller than 
the one presented. 
I II III IV
dGDP dGDP dGDP dGDP
Lagged Dependent variable 0.00125*** 0.00111*** __ __
(0.000178) (0.000183)
Human Capital -1.306*** -1.425*** -1.112** -1.435***
(0.390) (0.400) (0.508) (0.499)
Inflation -0.133*** -0.153*** -0.163*** -0.182***
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0407) (0.0387)
Investments -7.216*** -7.146*** -7.457*** -6.511**
-1.986 -2.083 -2.545 -2.567
Government $ -1.399 -3.637* 1.025 -2.245
-2.036 -2.170 -3.430 -3.439
LGDPc1974 -0.352* -0.273 -0.236 -0.0416
(0.188) (0.194) (0.274) (0.265)
Dependency ratio 0.0312 0.0139 -0.0408 -0.0745
(0.0531) (0.0536) (0.0755) (0.0687)
IntDemand 0.00524*** 0.00427*** 0.00537*** 0.00452***
(0.00116) (0.00135) (0.00145) (0.00157)
Plurality __ -0.678*** __ -1.128***
(0.257) (0.313)
MDMH __ -0.00719*** __ -0.0103***
(0.00202) (0.00292)
LEFTC __ 0.00167 __ 0.00459*
(0.00211) (0.00234)
sCoordination -0.0524 -0.239 0.125 -0.234
(0.125) (0.175) (0.173) (0.238)
sDecommodification -0.462*** -0.395*** -0.519*** -0.421***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.149) (0.144)
sCoordination * sDecommodification 0.464*** 0.482*** 0.445** 0.508***
(0.154) (0.152) (0.201) (0.192)
N 578 578 595 595
Year Fixed Effetcs Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R 2 0.60 0.61 0.53 0.54
Standard errors in parentheses
* p  < 0.1, ** p  < 0.05, *** p  < 0.01
OLS w/PCSE
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coordination and decommodification, is positively correlated with economic growth, supporting the 
second and the third hypothesis (see also figure 4 in the appendix for a three-dimensional depiction 
that incorporates both assertions). In other words, an increase in coordination seems to be positively 
correlated with economic growth given that the economy is decommodified and a decrease positive-
ly correlated with growth given that the economy is commodified. These preliminary results from 
the base models seem to verify our core argument, namely that complementarities between produc-
tion regimes and welfare states increase economic performance, measured as economic growth 
rates.  
 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of coordination on economic growth at various levels of decommodifica-
tion. Based on model I in table 2. 
 
 
 Of some curiosity, we find negative coefficients for variables that are normally expected to have 
positive effects on economic growth, including investment to GDP levels and human capital. This 
may, however, be attributed to the institutions creating much of the positive effects that we would 
otherwise confer to these variables. This argument seems to have merits regarding investments 
since the bivariate correlation between investments and GDP growth is positive (see table 3 in the 
appendix). However, this is not the case for human capital. One could, therefore, be inclined to con-
clude that human capital is retarding economic growth, which seems counter-intuitively. The nega-
tive effects of human capital have been noted before in a panel setting (see e.g. Islam, 1995) with 
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possible explanations stemming from either a too weak proxy of human capital levels or an inap-
propriately simple inclusion of the effects of education on economic development. Under this as-
sumption, the effects of average years of education cannot be given the same expected effect as 
among a broader group of countries such as in Barro (1991) when levels of education are generally 
speaking high, and characteristics internal to education may be more important. In this respect, we 
lean towards the latter and note that the selection of countries under scrutiny consists of highly de-
veloped countries where modified years of education perhaps should be replaced with information 
about the institutional structure of the education system of the country. 
Moreover, Plurality and District magnitude is, contrary to our expectation, systematically and 
negatively correlated with economic growth. Of less curiosity, we find inflation to be systematically 
and negatively correlated with economic growth in all the estimated models. We expect this to be 
driven by periods of stagflation in the 1970s. Finally, we note that international demand is, as ex-
pected, positively correlated with economic growth across all the estimated models. 
 
Conclusion & Further research 
According to Jackson & Deeg (2006: 31) “[o]ne major issue dividing opinion in the literature is 
whether the role of the state and the impact of the welfare state should be included”. As argued in 
this paper it should be included. Our findings indicate that interaction effects between the produc-
tion system and the welfare can explain why some advanced capitalist democracies achieve better 
economic performance over the long term. The findings even suggest that our understanding of the 
economic effects of coordination is better understood and in accordance with real-world observa-
tions when we include the welfare state in the analysis. The findings more precisely indicate that a 
high degree of strategic coordination in combination with a high degree of decommodification as 
well as a high degree of market coordination in combination with a low degree of decommodifica-
tion increases long-term economic growth. It appears, at least at an aggregate level, that the welfare 
state can be complementary to the production system, and hence create better economic perfor-
mance. 
We have argued that the complementarities induced by the beneficial constraint/flexibility argu-
ment and the skill-asset/social-security argument are important in linking VoC with welfare state 
research. However, some scholars might argue, and in their good right, that it is somewhat prob-
lematic to induce certain complementarities from empirical analyses at the aggregate level. An im-
portant task for future research is, therefore, to examine what these complementarities consist of at 
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a disaggregated level. We believe that such a research agenda would benefit from both quantitative-
ly as well as qualitatively oriented analyses. 
Moreover, if some major policy implication may be deduced from the analysis, it would be that 
in pursuit of increased economic performance, politicians and officials in affluent economies should 
pay close attention to how the welfare state can complement firms’ investment strategies. The 
welfare state is, in our opinion, too often portrayed as an obstacle to creating growth and not as a 
possible prerequisite for creating growth. The results presented here suggest that a shift of emphasis 
should be in place. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 4: Plot of Marginal Effects (Model I): 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (1974-2009) 
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List of Variables:  
Variable Description Source 
dGDPc Percentage growth rate in Real Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita (rGDPc). 
rGDPc is constructed from real GDP at constant 2005 PPP’s, 
US$ in millions, divided with population size in millions.  
 
Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1. 
Human Capital A measure of country average years of schooling from Barro 
& Lee (2013), adjusted by rates of returns for levels of educa-
tion introduced in Psacharopoulos (1994).   
Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1.  
Inflation Percentage growth in the OECD Consumer Prices Indices 
(total) from the OECD MEI database.  
For Ireland datapoints are missing for the years 1971-1974. 
Several solutions to obtaining the data are available, includ-
ing imputation and the use of data from other sources. We 
have chosen to use data that is compatible from the World 
Development Indicators for the four years.  
OECD (2016).  
 
The World Bank 
(2016). 
Investments Share of current GDP (output-side) of gross capital formation 
at current PPP’s.  
Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1. 
Government Share of current GDP (output-side) of government consump-
tion at current PPP’s.  
Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1. 
LGDPc1971 Logarithm of rGDPc in 1974.  Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1. 
Plurality Measure of whether the legislators were elected using 
winner-takes-all system, or not.  
 
Beck, et al. (2001) 
MDMH Mean District Magnitude (MDM), House and Senate. A 
measure of number of representatives elected by constituency 
size.  
Beck, et al. (2001) 
LEFTC Share of seats in parliament won by leftist parties in the most 
recent government as a percentage of all seats held by the 
government.  
Brady, Hubert & Ste-
vens (2014).  
Dependency Age Dependency: The ratio of depends as persons under 15 
and over 64 divided by the working-age population.  
The World Bank 
(2016). 
IntDemand Measure of total international demand, constructed as the 
total country average growth rates by year, excluding the 
country of interest of measurement. This is weighted by trade 
openness, the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP, 
from the CWS dataset.  
Feenstra, Inklaar & 
Timmer (2015), Penn 
World Tables 8.1. 
 
Brady, Hubert & Ste-
vens (2014) 
sCoordination Standardized composite measure of neo-corporatism based 
on eleven items originally proposed in Hicks & Kenworthy 
(1998).  The index is consistent with theoretical aspects of 
the Varieties of Capitalism framework.  
 
Higher values correspond to higher degrees of consistency 
between measured institutions and the theoretical CME insti-
Huber, et al. (2004).  
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tutional structure, whereas lower values are associated with 
higher degrees of consistency with the theoretical LME insti-
tutional structure. 
 
For missing years (following 1994) the available data has 
been extrapolated. This is not expected to have strong effects 
on the integrity of the measure due to general stability in the 
index.  
sDecommodifi-
cation 
Standardized composite measure of unemployment, sickness, 
and pension generosity. See Scruggs, et al. (2014).   
 
Higher values are associated with a higher degree of decom-
modification.  
Scruggs, et al. (2014).  
 
 
 
 
